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 Introduction 
 
The term corporate governance relates to how corporations, firms, organizations etc. 
are owned, managed and controlled. This is an issue which has been the subject of 
much debate in recent years.1 The general reason for this, of course, is that how firms 
are managed matters a good deal for their economic performance. However, to 
understand the reasons for the recent upsurge in the interest for these issues and the 
particular focus that the debates typically have had, one must look more closely at 
the particular background for these debates. In this paper we will try to give an 
overview of these background issues, trying to explain how different definitions of 
what corporate governance is about reflect different perspectives on how to 
understand economic activity and economic performance. A central aim of the paper 
is to give a theoretical background for empirically oriented research on corporate 
governance in Norway.2 After having outlined the theorietical issues we thus 
conclude the paper by indicating some implications for empirical research. 
 
The paper originated as a spin-off from the TSER-project ‘Corporate Governance, 
Innovation, and Economic Performance in the EU.’ The project was cordinated by 
William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, who have written extensively on this 
subject. The present paper to a large extends builds on their contributions. An 
excellent summary of their work is found in their report Perspectives on Corporate 
Governance, Innovation, and Economic Performance, 3 which is the main theoretical 
document from the TSER-project.  
 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan’s perspective on corporate governance has to a large extent 
been forged through a critique of the neoclassical economic thinking. To grasp their 
position it is thus important to understand the nature of this critique. For instance, 
one of their central concerns is to argue against the proposition that to ‘maximize 
shareholder value’ should be the dominant principle of corporate governance,4 a 
proposition which represents a relatively straightforward application of neoclassical 
economic thinking to the issue of corporate governance. The present paper shares 
this critical position towards the traditional neoclassical approach. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, David Greenaway, ‘Policy Forum: Corporate Governance: Editorial 
Note,’ The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, No. 430, May 1995, pp. 676-677; Mary O’Sullivan, 
Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the 
United States and Germany, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 1. 
2 See the forthcoming papers by Anders Ekeland and Siri Aanstad, ‘Corporate governance – 
a comment on recent Norwegian empirical research,’ and ‘State ownership in the Norwegian 
corporate governance debate.’ 
3 William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, Perspectives on Corporate Governance, 
Innovation, and Economic Performance, report to ‘Corporate Governance, Innovation, and 
Economic Performance in the EU,’ a research project funded by the Targeted Socio-
Economic Research (TSER) Programme of the European Commission (DGXII) under the 
Fourth Framework Programme, coordinated by William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan. 
4 See, for instance, William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, ‘Maximizing shareholder value: 
a new ideology for corporate governance,’ Economy and Society, Volume 29, Number 1, 
February 2000, pp. 13-35. 
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Conceptions of corporate governance in different schools of thought 
In addition to the work of Lazonick and O’Sullivan we will also give an overview of 
some  other ‘heterodox’ contributions, i.e. contributions from outside of the 
mainstream of the economics tradition, belonging to the more loosely defined 
traditions of institutional and evolutionary economics, economic sociology, etc. 
Conceptions of corporate governance in different schools of 
thought 
The differences in theoretical perspective are reflected already in the definition of the 
subject area, in the delimitation of what the term corporate governance covers. 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan define corporate governance as the social process that 
shapes ‘who makes investment decisions in corporations, what types of investments 
they make, and how returns from investments are distributed.’5 In their approach 
they explicitly focus on the implications that different corporate governance have for 
innovation and economic performance. Specifically, they claim that if a system of 
corporate governance is to support innovation, it must generate three conditions:  
 
• Financial commitment 
• Organizational integration 
• Insider control.’6  
 
 
In more detail, to be conducive to innovation a system of corporate governance must 
be constituted so as to ‘provide the institutional support for: 
 
• Commitment of resources to irreversible investments with uncertain returns 
• Integration of human and physical resources into an organizational process to 
develop and utilize technology 
• The vesting of strategic control within corporations in the hands of those 
who, as insiders, have the incentives and abilities to allocate resources to 
innovative investments.’7  
 
If these conditions are not met, they claim, ‘business enterprises cannot generate 
innovation through strategic investment in collective learning processes.’8 The 
emphasis here on the dependence of innovation on collective learning processes in its 
turn raises the question of what kind of collectivity is at issue here, who are insiders 
and who are outsiders to this collectivity, etc.9 Thus, in Lazonick and O’Sullivan’s 
definition corporate governance covers a quite wide array of issues relating to how 
firms and corporations are managed and organized, and of organizational routines 
                                                 
5 Lazonick and O’Sullivan, Perspectives on Corporate Governance, Innovation, and 
Economic Performance, op.cit., p. 14. 
6 O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control, op.cit., p. 39. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid., p. 40. 
9 See, for instance, William Lazonick, Business Organization and the Myth of the Market 
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, especially pp. 23-58 (the chapter 
entitled ‘Institutional foundations of industrial dominance and decline’). 
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and practices more generally. In particular, they emphasize that a theory of corporate 
governance should integrate ‘an analysis of the economics of innovation.’10 
 
The mainstream approach 
In the mainstream or neoclassical approach the term corporate governance is 
typically defined more narrowly, as the processes of supervision and control 
‘intended to ensure that the company’s management acts in accordance with the 
interests of the shareholders.’11 This restriction of the class of phenomena to which 
the term refers can be seen to follow in a quite straightforward manner from the basic 
presuppositions of neoclassical economic theory. We will here not go into detailed 
discussion of whether adherence to this or that particular assumption is necessary for 
a contribution to be qualified as neoclassical. It should be quite uncontroversial, 
however, to say that the use of the idealised model of free competition as the 
reference model for understanding how an economy works is central to neoclassical 
economic thinking.12 Mary O’Sullivan proposes a definition of neoclassical 
economics which well captures the essential points here. She uses the term 
‘neoclassical theory’ to refer to ‘that body of economic thought that uses the theory 
of the perfect market economy, whether explicitly or implicitly, as the benchmark for 
economic efficiency.’13 Central to this model of the perfect market economy or 
perfect competition is the idea of a non-intentional coordination through the price 
mechanism of the plans of radically independent economic actors.14 These actors are 
portrayed as being concerned exclusively with maximally furthering their own 
private interests.  
 
A normative theory of equilibrium – not of price adjustment and marked dynamics 
In general, the economic actors are seen as utility maximization; in the case of firms, 
utility maximization takes the form of profit maximization. Given the ‘initial’ 
distribution of economic resources, the state of production technology, etc., the 
quantities of different goods which the economic actors will supply respectively 
demand in the market will depend on the prices of these goods. There is a very 
common misunderstanding of the general equilibrium models. People tend to think 
that in this model prices will then adjust so that total supply equals total demand, 
where nobody will have any incentive to alter the quantities they supply or demand 
and the system thus will be in equilibrium. But this is not the case.  
 
The prices – like initial endowments and preferences are given, static, do not change. 
There is only adjustment of quantum of produced goods to prices which every 
                                                 
10 O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control, op.cit., p. 42. 
11 See, for instance, J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the 
Theory of Company Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 159; also Xavier Vives, 
‘Corporate Governance: Does It Matter?’ in Xavier Vives (ed.), Corporate Governance: 
Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 
1-21, especially p. 1. 
12 See, for instance, Bernard Guerrien, L’économie néo-classique, Paris: Éditions La 
Découverte, 1989, pp. 8-9. 
13 O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control, op.cit., p. 3. 
14 See Guerrien, op.cit., p. 9. 
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producer takes as given15. There can in a general equilibrium model be no trading to 
prices that are not the equilibrium prices, that would change the initial 
endowements16 and the system would never reach equilibrium. One might then ask 
by what mechanism the equilibrium prices are found. Walras introduced the notion 
of ‘tantônement”, ‘groping’- until the equilibrium prices were found. Others have 
proposed  some type auctionarius, proposing prices until the consistent equilibrium 
set was found. How one shall explain the lack of such auctions in real life is beyond 
the scope of this paper17. The important thing here is not to confuse the dynamic 
economic thinking of Smith and Ricardo where actual prices by a dynamic process 
gravitate towards their prices of production18 with the pure adjustment of quanta to 
given prices. Contrary to very widespread views – general eguilibrium theory is not a 
theory of markets, it is not a theory of competition, of markets but statement that 
given certain totally unrealistic restrictions on the utility and production functions a 
unique equilibrium can exists. But that is not a description of competition and 
markets, fundamentally dynamic phenomena.  
 
That one can compare different equilibrium states has nothing to do with having a 
real theory of how one moves from one state to another. The mathematical apparatus 
for such a dynamic approach exists as differential/difference equation systems, but 
they do not prove that a perfect market economy is the most efficient system, that it 
is Pareto optimal at the same time etc. On the contrary, introducing dynamics makes 
the economic models just as ‘chaotic’ and unpredictable as the weather.19  
 
Since the mechanism by which the equilibrium prices is not empirically founded the 
mainstream theory is extremely normative, much more so than most people tend to 
believe. They see it mostly as a very abstract representation of real life competition. 
But the normative aspects of mainstream GE (general equilibrium) theory are 
important. If the real economic system in question differs from that portrayed by the 
model of the perfect market, this reflects an imperfection in reality, a market 
imperfection. Something, for instance regulations, institutional practices, social 
norms, or the like, interferes with the workings of the market mechanism. If these 
interferences can be removed or suppressed so that the system can work more in 
accordance with the model of perfect competition, the result will be a more efficient 
allocation of economic resources.20. As a guideline for policy this is very influential, 
                                                 
15 In the Norwegian tradition shaped by R. Frisch this is called ‘prisfast 
kvantumstilpassning’.  
16 Endowments must be understood as amounts of exchangeable goods, there is no money in 
this model, it is a barter economy, where one unit good is choosen as the ‘nummeraire’. But 
since money (numbers in a bank account) cannot have any utility in itself, the most plausible 
interpretation is that this is some real good. We shall not here go into the various ways one 
can reconcile this wide the fundamental role that money plays most economic systems.  
17 See for example Rune Skarstein, Sosialøkonomiens elendighet, 1976 for a closer 
discussion of this in Norwegian. See also HAAVELMO, T. Hva kan statiske 
likevektsmodeller fortelle oss? (What can Static Equilibrium Models tell us?) In Festskrift til 
Fredrik Zeuthen. Copenhagen, 1958  
18 Since there is contiunous innovation (technical and organisational change) the system will 
never be in a static equilibrium – a notion foreign to Smith’s thinking.  
19 An excellent overview is given in: Chaos: Significance, Mechanism, and Economic 
Applications, William J. Baumol, Jess Benhabib, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, pp. 77-105  
20 ibid., p. 11. 
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one extreme example being the case of Russia where the belief that if one just 
deregulated and privatized equilibrium would be reached, not understanding that 
general equilibrium theory is just what is says, an equilibrium theory that gives no 
theoretical insight into dynamic transformation process the most important of course 
being innovation and technical change21.  
 
Functionalism 
The neoclassical model of the perfect market economy thus is an idea of an optimally 
functioning system, an economic system where resources are allocated optimally. 
This also would seem to imply an optimal functioning of each economic actor: no 
opportunities for gain will be left unexploited if actors are free to pursue their own 
interests. That economic practice in each firm actually will converge to best practice 
in the field is partly also explained by a functionalist argument: firms whose practice 
does not approach best practice in the field will not be able to survive in the 
competition. This conviction that in a perfect market economy economic resources 
will simply be utilized in an optimal way makes it understandable that the standard 
neoclassical theory has not been interested in what goes on inside firms or 
organizations.  
 
Black box 
As has often been said, the theory treats the firm as a ‘black box,’ operating instead 
with an idealized entity called the ‘representative firm.’ In the words of Joseph E. 
Stiglitz: ‘Many economists argued that there was no need to look carefully into the 
black box called the firm: firms maximized profits (stock market value); if managers 
didn’t, they would be replaced; and firms that didn’t maximize wouldn’t survive. 
Accordingly, what went on inside the black box was mere detail. The behavior of the 
firm could be described completely without knowledge of those details.’22 He adds 
that those who argued otherwise (here he mentions Berle and Means and March and 
Simon) ‘were given short thrift by the mainstream of the economics profession, as 
heretics who ill understood the basic tenets of the profession.’23 
 
Thus corporate governance, the governance of firms, how firms are managed and 
function, is for neoclassical economic theory a non-problem if the economic system 
in question is a perfect market economy, where all economic actors maximizes their 
particular interests, and notably firms maximize profits. For corporate governance to 
be an issue, there thus has to come in element which in a significant way makes the 
system in question deviate from a perfect market economy, there has to be present an 
anomaly in relation to this ideal situation.  
Corporate governance as an agency problem 
This anomaly or disturbing element in relation to the ideal of the perfect market 
economy is what is termed agency problems. Thus, as Oliver Hart formulates it, 
                                                 
21  ‘False Expectations,’ in Lawrence R. Klein and Marshall Pomer (eds.), The New Russia: 
Transition Gone Awry, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001 with articles by Arrow, 
Stiglitz, Tobin and Klein among others. 
22 Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Symposium on Organizations and Economics,’ Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Volume 5, Number 2, Spring 1991, pp. 15-24. The quote is from p. 15. 
23 ibid., p. 16. 
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‘corporate governance does not matter in the absence of agency problems.’24 This is 
because ‘in the absence of agency problems, all individuals associated with an 
organisation can be instructed to maximise profit or net market value or to minimise 
costs.’25  
 
However, the problem here is precisely that one cannot simply take for granted that 
‘all individuals associated with an organisation’ will in fact act as they are instructed 
to do, namely in accordance with the objective of maximizing the organization’s 
profits. Notably, if ‘an owner hires a manager to run his (or her) firm for him,’26 the 
owner cannot take it for granted that the manager will act in the interest of the owner. 
An essential reason for this being so, is that ‘information is imperfect and costly.’27 
Whether a manager in fact acts in the interests of the owner or not will often not at 
all be immediately apparent. To find out about this, the owner would typically have 
to collect and process a lot of information, and this is costly. It follows that managers 
have ‘considerable discretion,’ notably ‘discretion to pursue their own interests,’28 
and there is no guarantee that the particular interests of managers will coincide with 
the owners’ interests in maximizing the profits of the firm. Thus, ‘the fundamental 
problem of owners of firms is how to motivate their managers to act in the interests 
of the owners.’29 This gives rise to a system of efforts to control managers, through 
incentive schemes, monitoring, sanctions, etc., and it is this apparatus of supervision 
and control of managers which the term ‘corporate governance’ refers to in the 
neoclassical perspective.  
 
The principle of maximizing shareholder value 
We should note that this type of agency problem is in principle not restricted to the 
relationship between owners and managers. Also other categories of people 
associated with an organization, such as ordinary employees or workers, may have 
some discretion to pursue their own interests, which again may not coincide with the 
owners’ interests in maximizing the profits of the firm. Thus, within the overlapping 
traditions of neoclassical economics and rational choice theory there has developed a 
large literature on how to develop incentive systems so that employees will find it in 
their interests to act in the interests of the owners.30 
 
However, it seems that the term corporate governance largely has been reserved for 
agency problems in the relations between owners and managers. Especially, 
corporate governance is considered a significant issue in large, public companies, 
where share ownership is widely diffused over a large number of small owners. This 
creates particularly difficult problems from the point of view of controlling managers 
so that they act in the interests of the owners, because ‘the owners, that is, the 
                                                 
24 Oliver Hart, ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications,’ The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 105, No. 430, May 1995, pp. 678-689. The quote is from p. 678. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid. 
27 Stiglitz, op.cit., p. 16. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 See, for instance, Gary J. Miller, ‘Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in 
Hierarchies,’ in Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi (eds.), The Limits of Rationality, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 324-348. 
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shareholders, even though they typically have (ultimate) residual control rights in the 
form of votes, are too small and numerous to exercise this control on a day-to-day 
basis.’31 Thus, the issue of corporate governance in particular arises in the context of 
‘the separation of ownership and control,’ typical of the modern corporation.  
 
Owners vs. other stakeholders 
We can now see how the perspective that to ‘maximize shareholder value’ should be 
the dominant principle of corporate governance, represents a relatively straight-
forward application of neoclassical economic thinking to the issue of corporate 
governance. An essential additional premise here is the view that shareholders are the 
owners of the corporation. The basic tenet of neoclassical theory that optimality 
requires that firms be run in accordance with the owners’ interest in maximizing 
profits then translates into the proposition that corporations be run so as to maximize 
shareholder value. Why are the shareholders considered to be the owners? From the 
perspective of neoclassical economic thinking, the essential point here is that they are 
‘residual claimants.’ Whereas all other parties involved (managers, workers, 
suppliers, consultants, etc.) have their remuneration determined ‘on the basis of 
contracts that specify the relation between their contributions to the productive 
process and the returns they receive,’32 shareholders are the residual claimants whose 
remuneration is directly tied to the economic returns of the corporation.  
The Lazonick and O’Sullivan critique 
As Mary O’Sullivan characterizes this view: ‘As “residual claimants”, shareholders 
thus bear the risk of the corporation’s making a profit or loss and have an interest in 
allocating corporate resources to their “best alternative uses” to make the residual as 
large as possible.’33 It follows that ‘the “maximization of shareholder value” will 
result in superior economic performance not only for the particular corporation but 
also for the economy as a whole.’34 In other words, corporations should be run in the 
interests of the shareholders precisely because the shareholders are the ones who 
have a direct interest in the maximization of the corporation’s profits. 
 
Had these shareholder interests been allowed to set themselves through 
unchallenged, this would have been in accordance with the presuppositions of the 
perfect market economy. However, the presence of an ‘agency problem, or conflict 
of interest,’ as Hart puts it,35 distorts this picture, causing a deviation from optimality 
and thus making corporate governance an issue. 
The assumption of purely self-interested actors 
We should note how the nature of this conflict of interest is conceived. The interests 
in question are thought of as purely egoistic interests, the behaviour is purely self-
interested. Individuals associated with an organization ‘do not care per se about the 
outcome of the organisation’s activities,’36 but only with these outcomes in so far as 
                                                 
31 Hart, op.cit., pp. 680-681. 
32 Lazonick and O’Sullivan, Perspectives on Corporate Governance, Innovation, and 
Economic Performance, op.cit., p. 24. 
33 O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control, op.cit., p. 43. 
34 ibid. 
35 Hart, op.cit., p. 678. 
36 ibid.  
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they imply costs and benefits for themselves. The conflict of interest is thus 
constructed as a conflict between the purely private interests of the managers and the 
general interest of profit maximization. Managers are supposed to act against the 
interests of the organizations they are running whenever the private benefits to them 
of doing so exceeds the private costs for them, i.e. whenever they can benefit from 
this and get away with it. Likewise, employees will act against the interests of the 
organization whenever this is to their own personal advantage. Notably, employees 
are thought to have an interest in shirking: they will collect their wages and ‘work as 
little as they can get away with.’37 Hence, the strong preoccupation in this theory 
with devising elaborate incentive schemes to align the private interests of managers 
and employees more closely with the goal of profit maximization.  
 
That the economic actors in this conception are thought to be exclusively self-
interested in their motivation for action also applies to the shareholders, but since 
their interests are in the maximization of the profits of the corporation, their 
particular personal interests happen to coincide with the general interest. 
Accordingly, in this way of thinking conflict within organizations is conceived 
exclusively as a conflict between actors who all try to further their own particular 
private interests, where, moreover, the interests of one category of actors happen to 
coincide with the general interest. The picture we thus get is one where the general 
interest in the optimal functioning of the economy in accordance with the model of 
the perfect market economy is obstructed by particular groups of actors like 
managers and employees furthering their own particular self-interest. 
 
What is ruled out by assumption here is the possibility that some conflicts of interests 
in an organization might instead represent disagreement over, different perspectives 
on, what will further the common good of the organization. Different groups will 
have different experiences, will each have different notions of what are problems, 
what are strengths and weaknesses, of what is important and less important, etc. If 
these different perspectives of the general good are recognized as such, and not 
simply as expressions of particular egoistic interests, it might be sensible to view the 
organization’s objectives as emerging through some kind of process of reconciliation 
of different perspectives, like in the reciprocal critical examination of arguments in a 
discussion, where the dominant perspective is at least to some extent transformed 
through going into a dialogue with other perspectives, rather than seeing the 
organization’s objectives as something which is unambiguously given in advance.38 
                                                 
37 Miller, op.cit., p. 341. See also ibid., pp. 327-328. 
38 For related ideas, cf. the treatment of organizational learning in Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
Perspectives on Corporate Governance, Innovation, and Economic Performance, op.cit., pp. 
73-79, where they discuss ideas of authors like Peter Senge on ‘shared vision,’ ‘co-creating’ 
and ‘generative learning.’ According to D. Flood, to whom Lazonick and O’Sullivan refer 
(op.cit., pp. 76-77), creating a ‘shared vision’ is ‘the antithesis of visioning exclusively from 
the top of a management hierarchy.’ The concern here is with ‘how to move visioning from 
the top of the management hierarchy to a widespread intensive dialogue – from “telling” to 
“co-creating.”’ By ‘co-creating’ is meant ‘a widespread and collaborative process where a 
shared vision is built in a mood of generative learning.’ The quotes here are from D. Flood, 
Rethinking the Fifth Discipline: Learning Within the Unknowable, Routledge, 1999, p. 24,  
which, in turn, discusses P. Senge, C. Roberts, R. Ross and B. Smith, The Fifth Discipline 
Fieldbook, 1994. 
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Stiglitz and Simon: on the empirical basis for the axiom of pure self-interest 
Now, there seems to be little empirical evidence for the central premise of the 
neoclassical, agency problem conception of corporate governance, namely that 
individuals associated with an organization do not care per se about the outcome of 
the organization’s activities and will only work for organizational goals to the extent 
that this contributes directly to their own economic self-interest. Discussing precisely 
this view that only economic incentives or rewards will make people work for 
organizational goals, Herbert Simon claims that ‘organizations would be far less 
effective systems than they actually are if such rewards were the only means, or even 
the principal means, of motivation available. In fact, observation of behavior in 
organization reveals other powerful motivations that induce employees to accept 
organizational goals and authority as bases for their actions,’39 the most important of 
these mechanisms being ‘organizational identification.’40  
 
As Stiglitz approvingly summarizes Simon’s point: ‘Simon argues persuasively that 
in successful organizations, workers identify with the organization’s objective; that 
they take on the organization’s objective as their own.’41 What here is said about the 
motivation of employees or workers to act in accordance with organizational goals 
applies equally, or perhaps even more, to managers.42 Thus, in Stiglitz’ view, ‘the 
incentives paradigm can neither explain the structure of observed incentive schemes 
nor what it is that motivates managers and workers.’ Consequently, ‘if economists 
want to understand what makes managers work and what differentiates successful 
from unsuccessful organizations, we may need to look beyond the compensation 
schemes and the economists’ standard incentives paradigm.’43 Simon is even more 
explicit about the limitations of the neoclassical approach in this area: ‘The attempts 
of the new institutional economics to explain organizational behavior solely in terms 
of agency, asymmetric information, transaction costs, opportunism, and other 
concepts drawn from neoclassical economics ignore key organizational mechanisms 
like authority, identification, and coordination, and hence are seriously incomplete.’44 
Clearly, to the extent that this is correct it indicates the need for a much broader 
approach to the issue of corporate governance than the agency problem approach of 
neoclassical tradition. 
 
Clearly, then, there is reason to have serious doubts about the central premise of the 
agency problems approach to corporate governance, namely that managers and 
employees do not care per se about the performance of the organization but will only 
work for organizational goals to the extent that this contributes directly to their own 
economic self-interest. On the contrary, successful organizations are precisely 
characterized by managers and employees identifying with the goals of the 
organization, taking on these goals as their own.  
 
                                                 
39 Herbert A. Simon, ‘Organizations and Markets,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Volume 5, Number 2, Spring 1991, pp. 25-44. The quote is from p. 34. 
40 ibid. 
41 Stiglitz, op.cit., p. 22. Italics in the original. 
42 Cf. Simon, op.cit., p. 30. 
43 Stiglitz, op.cit., p. 22. 
44 Simon, op.cit., p. 42. 
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A central question then becomes what are the conditions for this kind identification 
to happen. An answer may run along the lines that this requires some measure of 
integration in some kind of collective or community: one participates in, contributes 
to, some kind of common project. For this participation, this membership, not simply 
to be a matter of rhetoric and manipulation, it must have some kind of real 
foundation, through some measure of commitment, some measure of communality of 
destiny, or the like. This is closely connected to the issue of organizational 
integration, central to the perspective of Lazonick and O’Sullivan,45 where key 
questions are: How are different types of actors integrated into the organization? 
Who are integrated in the organization and who remain outsiders, treated as ordinary 
‘factors of production?’ Under what conditions will different types of actors be 
integrated in the organization, in what ways, and what are the consequences for 
organizational learning, innovation and economic performance? We will come back 
to the issue of organizational integration further below.  
From imperfect information to…perfect contracts? 
We should here comment upon a central element in the agency problem perspective 
of corporate governance, namely that what course of action will maximize a firm’s 
profits is in principle something which is given in advance. This is closely connected 
to the assumption of perfect information on the part of economic actors in the model 
of the perfect market economy. When this model is applied as a measuring rod for 
judging actual economic systems, it may then be recognized that the assumption of 
perfect information is not a reasonable assumption under the given circumstances. 
Thus, it may be acknowledged that information is imperfect, but this assumption of 
imperfect information is precisely then conceptualized as a deviation from an ideal of 
perfect information, as a secondary complication introduced into the picture, making 
adaptations deviate from the ideal situation of the perfect market economy. Notably, 
the relaxation of the assumption of perfect information and the consequent 
introduction of imperfect information is made through introducing information costs, 
the costs of gathering and processing information, as a new production cost. In the 
words of Israel M. Kirzner, ‘for the mainstream, imperfect information is primarily a 
circumstance constraining the pattern of attained equilibrium.’46  
 
Thus, for the mainstream (neoclassical) tradition it appears as a problem that 
managers may have considerable discretion. Discretion is here exclusively thought of 
as a discretion to pursue own interests, as opposed to the interests of owners in 
maximizing the profit of the organization, a discretion they have owing to the fact 
that owners (shareholders) have imperfect information concerning the managers’ 
actions.47 The managers have discretion to choose whether to maximize own 
interests or owners’ interests, but what courses of action each of these objectives 
imply is not thematized as an issue. Discretion is here not conceptualized as a basic 
trait of actors who act creatively in a largely open situation. As Richard Nelson 
claims, in neoclassical theories of the firm ‘the “economic problem” is basically 
about getting private incentives right, not about identifying the best thing to do, 
                                                 
45 See, for instance, O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control, op.cit., p. 39, Lazonick, 
Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy, op.cit., pp. 23-58. 
46 Israel M. Kirzner, ‘Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An 
Austrian Approach,’ Journal of Economic Literature, Volume XXXV, March 1997, pp. 60-
85. The quote is from p. 62. 
47 Cf. Stiglitz, op.cit., p. 16; Hart, op.cit., pp. 678-679. 
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which is assumed to be no problem.’48 In other words, the theory takes ‘a firm’s 
choice sets as obvious to it and the best choice similarly clear and obvious.’49 Thus, a 
frequently raised objection against the neoclassical approach is that ‘neoclassical 
theory has portrayed the individual decision as a mechanical exercise in constrained 
maximization,’ a portrayal which ‘robs human choice of its essentially open-ended 
character, in which imagination and boldness must inevitably play central roles.’50 
 
Oliver Hart on optimal principle-agent contracts 
Let us illustrate these points further by commenting on Oliver Hart’s discussion of 
‘optimal principal–agent contracts.’51 (The principal hires an agent to perform some 
task for him or her, for instance run a firm. In this case, the owner is the principal, 
the manager is the agent.) Optimal principal–agent contracts are contracts which ‘are 
“comprehensive” in the sense that a contract specifies all parties’ obligations in all 
future states of the world, to the fullest extent possible (i.e. to the extent that these 
obligations are observable and verifiable).’52 The notion of optimal principal–agent 
contracts is for Hart central to an understanding of corporate governance because if 
contracts are comprehensive, governance structure will not matter: ‘in a 
comprehensive contracting world, everything has been specified in advance, i.e. 
there are no “residual” decisions.’53 Thus, a second necessary condition for corporate 
governance to matter, in addition to the presence of agency problems, is that 
contracts be incomplete: ‘governance structure matters when some actions have to be 
decided in the future that have not been specified in an initial contracts.’54 
 
Now, to explain that there are incomplete contracts Hart invokes the costs of writing 
comprehensive contracts. He refers to the transaction cost literature, which he claims 
has identified three costs that are particularly important: ‘First there is the cost of 
thinking about all the different eventualities that can occur during the course of the 
contractual relationship, and planning how to deal with them. Second, there is the 
cost of negotiating with others about these plans. Third, there is the cost of writing 
down the plans in such a way that they can be enforced by a third party – such as a 
judge – in the event of a dispute.’55 It is because of these costs that ‘the parties will 
not write a comprehensive contract,’ but instead ‘write a contract that is 
incomplete.’56 
 
                                                 
48 Richard R. Nelson, ’Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does It Matter?’ in Richard R. 
Nelson: The Sources of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1996, pp. 100-119, quoted from p. 105. The article was originally published in 
Strategic Management Journal, Winter 1991, pp. 61-74. 
49 ibid., p. 107. 
50 Kirzner, op.cit., p. 64. 
51 Hart, op.cit., pp. 679-680. 
52 ibid., p. 679. 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid., p. 680. 
56 ibid. 
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Critique of the concept of perfect information 
However, there is reason to have serious doubt about this whole notion that it is in 
principle possible to specify all eventualities in advance, but that the costs of doing 
this would be so high that maximization dictates that one only incurs some of these 
costs, settling for a level of comprehensiveness of the contract which is some way 
from the ideal state where everything is specified in advance. One may instead claim 
that this is intrinsically impossible that this could be known in advance, that the 
whole idea is incompatible with basic traits of human action, such as its largely open-
ended character, creativity, initiative. Even for simple, standardized work operations 
the idea of specifying everything in advance is problematic.57 More generally, 
instructions are generally not given as detailed commands to do specific actions, but, 
for instance, as more general instructions concerning the result to be produced.58 As 
Herbert Simon reminds us, ‘obeying operating rules literally is a favorite method of 
work slowdown during labor-management disputes.’ Instead, ‘what is required is that 
employees take initiative and apply all their skill and knowledge to advance the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives.’59 
 
The idea that a comprehensive contract where everything has been specified in 
advance constitutes the ideal, but where consideration of the costs of establishing 
such a contract necessitates a deviation from this ideal, is also highly problematic as 
a practical understanding, i.e. to the extent that the actors themselves have this 
understanding and are guided by this understanding in their actions. Commenting on 
these issues in the case of cooperation between separate business units, Stewart 
Macaulay observes that ‘carefully planned arrangements may create undesirable 
exchange relationships between business units. Some businessmen object that in such 
a carefully worked out relationship one gets performance only to the letter of the 
contract. Such planning indicates a lack of trust and blunts the demands of 
friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade.’60 If one 
really has the setting up of comprehensive contracts where all possible eventualities 
have been specified in advance as an ideal, this looks more like an obsession with 
control than a rational way of collaborating to get things done. This applies whether 
we are dealing with relationships between separate business units, between managers 
and workers, or between owners and managers. 
 
A distorted conception of trust 
More generally, accounting for trust is a fundamental problem for theories which 
conceive human actors as exclusively opportunistic and self-interested. If actors are 
exclusively interested in costs and benefits to themselves, they will break their 
commitments whenever they find that this is to their advantage. Charles F. Sabel 
                                                 
57 Cf., for instance, Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology 
and Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 4 (originally published in French in 
1989), on the separation of conception and execution of work operations in ‘Taylorism.’ 
58 Cf. Simon, op.cit., p. 31. 
59 ibid., p. 32. 
60 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,’ 
American Sociological Review, Volume 28, Number 1, 1963, pp. 55-67. The quote is from p. 
64. This passage is quoted and discussed in Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social 
Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,’ American Journal of Sociology, Volume 91, 
Number 3, November 1985, pp. 481-510. Here the quote is on p. 496. 
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aptly characterizes this perspective on human action as ‘a science of suspicion.’61 As 
he observes, the corollary to the exclusive concern with own interests is a fear of 
being deceived: ‘it makes the pursuit of self-interest and the fear of deception 
(because the others are pursuing their own interests, too) the spring of individual 
action and the guiding motive of institutional construction.’62 As Mark Granovetter 
observes, in this perspective, the way to hinder people from cheating and breaking 
commitments is to set up clever institutional arrangements which make these 
practices too costly to engage in. But as Granovetter emphasizes, these arrangements 
‘do not produce trust but instead are a functional substitute for it.’63 Hence the 
distorted view of trust typically found in rational choice theory and related 
approaches: whether one trusts another person or not becomes exclusively a question 
of one’s assessment of what the other person sees as being to his advantage.64 
 
Again we may inquire into the practical implications of having this understanding as 
a practical understanding guiding one’s own actions. Would not having this kind of 
understanding as a practical understanding imply that one does not trust the other 
person but expects him to cheat and break commitments whenever he finds this to his 
advantage? And does one not also at the same time admit that one is not to be trusted 
oneself but will likewise always be ready to cheat the other if one finds that one can 
profit from it? But of course it would not be smart to say this openly, so instead one 
pretends that one is not exclusively self-interested and pretends that one does not 
believe the other to be exclusively self-interested, while at the same time expecting 
the other to put up the same pretence. To the extent that the actors themselves have 
this understanding this would precisely seem to imply a social world dominated by 
suspicion and deceit, as Sabel indicates.65 It is doubtful whether this kind of social 
world will function very well. We will come back to the issue of trust further below. 
 
Nelson and Winter and the implications of Knightian uncertainty 
To recapitulate, we have seen that in the neoclassical, agency problems approach to 
corporate governance, the fact that managers (or, for that matter, other actors 
involved in the organization) may have considerable discretion appears as a problem. 
This is so because in this conception discretion is exclusively thought of as a 
discretion to pursue own interests, in contradistinction to the interests of owners in 
maximizing the profit of the organization. Behind this way of posing the issues lies 
the fact that neoclassical theory treats ‘a firm’s choice sets as obvious to it and the 
best choice similarly clear and obvious.’66 Thus, the theory portrays profit 
                                                 
61 Charles F. Sabel, ‘Constitutional Ordering in Historical Context,’ in Fritz W. Scharpf 
(ed.), Games in Hierarchies and Networks: Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the 
Study of Governance Institutions, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1993, pp. 65-123. 
The quote is from p. 65. 
62 ibid. 
63 Granovetter, op.cit., p. 489. 
64 This view is very explicit in one of the most authoritative statements of rational choice 
theory, James S. Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990. See especially the chapter entitled 
‘Relations of Trust,’ pp. 91-116. 
65 Sabel, op.cit., p. 65. 
66 Nelson, op.cit., p. 107. 
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maximization as something which has a precise, unique solution.67 This may perhaps 
seem reasonable for very short term, localized problems where the conditions 
affecting the outcome of the action may be considered more or less given and known. 
However, isolating the short term from the longer term is in any case an arbitrary 
operation and when actions are taken in a longer term perspective the conditions 
affecting the outcome of the actions are much more uncertain. The situation is in 
large part open and successful action will to a large extent depend on creativity, 
initiative, etc. Neoclassical theory here tries to preserve the picture of the 
maximizing problem as something which has a precise, unique solution by 
essentially transforming the central terms of the maximization problem, preferences 
and the conditions of the choice situation, from given, observable magnitudes to 
increasingly hypothetical, inner, mental states of the actors: from given, observable 
prices of different observable goods and factors of production, to hypothesis of the 
actors’ beliefs about future states of the world, of the actors’ time discounting of 
preferences, their degree of risk aversion, etc.  
 
As Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter claim in their critique of ‘orthodox’ (i.e. 
mainstream, neoclassical) economic theory, when ‘faced with the facts of uncertainty 
and change, it attributes great explanatory force to elaborate hypothetical structures 
of preference and subjective probability. In gross disregard of Occam’s Razor, it 
multiplies these entities far beyond the empirical necessities imposed by any 
reasonable prospect of endowing them with operational content.’68 Thus, Nelson and 
Winter reject the notion of profit maximization in the neoclassical sense. They agree 
that the striving for profit is an important objective for business firms, but they 
disagree that this is fruitfully dealt with through the neoclassical approach. 
Accordingly, they endorse an assumption of ‘profit seeking’ or ‘profit-motivated 
striving,’ but not an assumption of profit maximization.69 This distinction is 
especially important in the context of change: ‘In a sufficiently calm and repetitive 
decision context, the distinction between striving for profit and profit maximization 
may be of little moment, but in a context of substantial change it matters a great deal. 
Strict adherence to optimization notions either requires or strongly encourages the 
disregard of essential features of change – the prevalence of Knightian uncertainty, 
                                                 
67 On the importance attached to unique predictions both in neoclassical economics and in 
rational choice theory more generally, see, for instance, Jon Elster, ‘When Rationality Fails,’ 
in Cook and Levi (eds.), op.cit., pp. 19-51, especially pp. 24-25; or Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts 
for the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, especially pp. 30-32.  
According to Elster, the theory gives unique predictions in standard cases. Elster then 
discusses some special, non standard cases where the theory does not give unique 
predictions, where thus ‘rationality fails.’ The claim that the theory in standard cases predicts 
one unique course of action as the one which maximizes utility, and which thus in this 
perspective is the one which rationality dictates, presupposes, of course, that the preferences 
and the beliefs (concerning the alternatives available) of the actor be known in advance. One 
might claim that this in many cases is not a very fruitful assumption, perhaps not even very 
meaningful. At a more fundamental level one may question whether the description of 
human action as following from decisions where actors compare alternatives and the pick out 
the best of them (cf., for instance, Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p. 13) is very fruitful as a general description of the structure of 
human action. We will briefly touch on these questions further below. 
68 Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 33. 
69 ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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the diversities of viewpoint, the difficulties of the decision process itself, the 
importance of highly sequential “groping” and of diffuse alertness for acquiring 
relevant information, the value of problem-solving heuristics, the likely scale and 
scope of actions recognized ex post as mistaken, and so forth.’70 
 
Thus, Nelson and Winter contend that profit-motivated striving is central to the 
understanding of firm behaviour, but claim that the interpretation which orthodox 
economic theory gives of this is static and distorted, depicting the economic actors as 
‘automaton maximizers’ merely picking the best alternative from a given choice set, 
a given set of alternatives.71 One consequence of this is that the theory is ill-equipped 
to analyse entrepreneurship. This, in its turn, is closely connected to the almost 
exclusive concern with equilibrium as opposed to disequilibrium. Consequently, 
while competition is a central term in orthodox theory, it is ill-equipped to analyse 
competitive processes. In effect, orthodoxy does not give an account of the 
competitive processes at all, but only of hypothetical results of such processes, 
without being able to show that these will actually come about as results. It has no 
adequate concepts for behaviour out of equilibrium: ‘there is no well-defined 
dynamic process of which the “equilibrium” is a stationary point: consistency 
relations, and not zero rates of change, define equilibrium.’72 
 
In other words, although neoclassical economic thought reserves an absolutely 
central place for competition, one may raise serious doubts as to whether its 
theoretical constructions adequately grasps this phenomenon. For instance, the 
Austrian tradition in modern economics, with its emphasis on the entrepreneurial 
dimension, is characterized by its sharp opposition to neoclassical theory in this 
regard. Summing up the Austrian position, Kirzner states that ‘the essence of 
competition is precisely that dynamic rivalry which the neoclassical equilibrium 
notion of competition is at great pains to exclude.’73 According to Kirzner, for the 
modern Austrian approach, the ‘perception of competition as the dynamic, driving 
force for discovery in the market process has become central.’74 
 
The dynamic aspects of markets and competition 
This points to a perspective on competition and the market which is quite different 
from the neoclassical one. As Edward S. Nell claims, ‘the function of the market is to 
generate competitive pressures to innovate and to assemble the financial resources to 
invest in innovations. Allocation of existing resources is of secondary importance; 
moreover, in practice, competition often generates waste, offsetting allocative 
efficiency.’75 Also Nelson and Winter focus on the dynamic properties of 
competition, on innovation and change. Commenting on economic models that have 
tried to graft ‘variables relating to technical advance onto orthodox theory in ways 
                                                 
70 ibid., p. 31. 
71 ibid, p. 32. The term ‘automaton maximizers’ they take from W.J. Baumol, 
‘Entrepreneurship in economic theory,’ American Economic Review, Volume 58, 1968, pp. 
64-71. 
72 Nelson and Winter, op.cit., p. 32. 
73 Kirzner, op.cit., p. 68. 
74 ibid., p. 69. 
75 Edward S. Nell, Making Sense of a Changing Economy: Technology, Markets and Morals, 
London: Routledge, 1996, p. 57. 
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that aim to preserve as much as possible of the standard theoretical structure,’76 in 
particular retaining ‘the basic assumptions that the firms in the economy maximize 
profit faultlessly and that the system as a whole is in (moving) equilibrium,’77  
they state that in the Western market economies ‘much technical advance results 
from profit-oriented investment on the part of business firms. The profit from 
successful innovation are disequilibrium phenomena, at least by the standard of 
equilibrium proposed in the models in question. They stem largely from the lead over 
competitors that innovation affords.’78 
 
The Austrian approach 
Also for the Austrian approach the focus is on the dynamic aspects of competition. 
According to Kirzner, ‘for the Austrian approach competition is socially beneficial 
primarily in a dynamic sense.’79 To get a grasp on this, the neoclassical notion of 
perfect competition or the perfect market economy is an irrelevant, indeed 
misleading, theoretical construction: ‘whatever social efficiency may be achieved in 
the market economy is not achieved at all by its participants behaving as if they were 
agents in a perfectly competitive equilibrium state – but precisely by their behaving 
entrepreneurially and (dynamically) competitively, under conditions of 
disequilibrium.’80 Kirzner here explicitly rejects the neoclassical claims of optimality 
for the market system or the perfect market economy: ‘Austrian economics makes no 
claim that the market outcomes at any given date are efficient and socially optimal 
(in any sense in which traditional neoclassical welfare theory would use these 
terms).’81 This entails rejection of the very notion of an ideal state where ‘the 
configuration of production and consumption decisions currently made is one which 
could, in the light of the relevant costs, not possibly have been improved upon.’82 
 
The Austrian position is of special interest here because it clearly shows that one 
may be a strong supporter of the market system while at the same time wholly reject 
any claims for optimality of this system, any claims that it produces outcomes which 
are optimal in the neoclassical sense. The issue here is clearly not one of merits or 
demerits of the market, but of what the market and competition is all about. 
 
Rejection of optimality claims and of the concept of perfect information 
We should also note that Kirzner’s rejection of any optimality claims for the market 
system also entails rejection of any claim for ‘informational efficiency for the price 
system’ or ‘informational efficiency for market outcomes.’83 This suggests that 
                                                 
76 Nelson and Winter, op.cit., p. 27. 
77 ibid., p. 28. 
78 ibid. Italics in the original. This, of course, is also Marx’ point about the ‘civilizing role of 
capital.’ The competitive process forces upon each capitalist a constant quest for temporary 
super profits through the production of relative surplus value, i.e. through constant 
innovation and technical advance. Capitalism thus becomes a tremendous engine for the 
development of the forces of production. 
79 Kirzner, op.cit., p. 74. 
80 ibid., p. 78. 
81 ibid., p. 81. Italics in the original. 
82 ibid., p. 65. 
83 ibid. 
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strongly implicated in the neoclassical notion of profit maximization as a type of 
problem which has a precise, unique solution, is the neoclassical view of knowledge 
as ideally perfect information. In reality, no actor has perfect information, but this 
presence of ‘imperfect information’ is then precisely conceptualized as a deviation 
from the ideal state of perfect information, as a secondary complication introduced 
into the picture, represented through the introduction of a specific type of costs, 
information costs: the ideal of perfect information is in principle attainable, but this 
is costly. In Kirzner’s words, the neoclassical notion of imperfect information ‘refers 
to known-to-be-available information which it is costly to produce,’ while the 
Austrian focus is on something quite different, namely on what has been termed 
‘previously unthought-of knowledge.’84 Richard Nelson illustrates these points well, 
asking ‘Does the assumption that “actors maximize” help one to analyze situations 
where some actors are not even aware of a possibility being considered by others?’85 
 
At a more fundamental level, we may raise doubts as to whether the structure of 
human action is well captured by portraying action as the simple carrying out of a 
decision. Taking up this issue would involve discussing questions of a more 
epistemological character, concerning the relationship between theoretical 
(descriptive) and practical knowledge, the nature of competence and learning, the 
issue of the distinction between tacit and codified knowledge, and so on. We will not 
go further into these questions here. 
 
Different views of the firm: Ronald Dore’s classification 
Having discussed some of the presuppositions for the mainstream or neoclassical 
approach to corporate governance, where corporate governance is restricted to the 
issue of how to ensure that managers follow the interests of the shareholders, let us 
now widen the perspective by looking at different view of the business firm in 
capitalist societies, to see which of these are compatible with the mainstream 
approach to corporate governance and which are not. In an article on what 
distinguishes Japan from other highly developed capitalist economies, Ronald Dore 
proposes a classification of such views, distinguishing four major positions on what a 
firm is.86 These are, first (1) the property view; then there are two sub-versions of the 
entity / community view, namely (2) the managerial community view and (3) the 
employee community view; lastly there is (4) the arena view.87 
 
The property view 
The ‘key assumption’ of the property view, according to Dore, is that ‘the legal 
situation … represents social reality.’ Thus, ‘a company is an entity set up by its 
capital-providing members to further their own material interests,’ and ‘the managers 
are their agents with a duty to give priority to that shareholder interest.’ Notably, for 
the managers it applies that ‘the careful buying of the best labour as cheaply as they 
can is as much part of their duty as getting the best bargain out of their suppliers of 
                                                 
84 ibid. 
85 Nelson, ‘Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does It Matter,’ op.cit., p. 108. 
86 Ronald Dore, ‘The Distinctiveness of Japan,’ in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck 
(eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, 
London: Sage Publications, 1997, pp. 19-32, especially pp. 19-20 
87 ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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raw materials.’ The treatment of employees is purely instrumental in relation to the 
goal of furthering shareholder interests. Hence, ‘policies of “worker involvement”, 
paternalistic welfare policies and premium wages above market “going rates” may all 
be permissible tactics, provided that they are “manipulations” designed to yield 
better value for money in the purchase of labour.’88 
 
The entity/ community view 
By contrast, the entity / community view sees the firm not merely as a set of 
instrumental arrangements, but more as a social entity analogous to a nation. This 
involves, on the one hand, that the firm is seen as an entity which transcends the 
group of individuals involved in it at any one time. The individuals involved may 
come and go, but the firm subsists. On the other hand, the group of people who at 
any one time embody the firm ‘constitute a community, tied together by bonds of 
interest in the community’s fate, obligations of cooperation and trust, the sharing of 
similar risks.’89 What motivates the distinction between two sub-versions of this 
view is the fact that there is variation concerning the definition of the boundaries of 
this community. The community may ‘be limited to the group of senior managers, or 
senior and middle managers, or it may be extended to the whole body of people who 
work in the firm, blue collar and white collar,’ although in the latter case usually only 
‘core’ workers are included, i.e. not part-time or temporary workers. 90 To the extent 
that the community is limited to managers, whether only senior or also including 
middle managers, we are concerned with the managerial community view, to the 
extent that all people working in the firm are included, we have the employee 
community view. 
 
The arena view 
Lastly, in the arena view the firm is seen as an arena where different kinds of actors 
(such as managers, skilled workers, suppliers, etc.), ‘motivated exclusively by self-
interest,’ make contracts and bargains of various kinds. Productive activities are seen 
as the fulfilment of such contracts. Thus, ‘the organization of a firm can be 
“dissolved” into a network of contracts’ between exclusively self-interested actors.91 
 
According to Dore, in the USA and UK the property view of the firm dominates, 
‘with some deviation .... towards the Managerial Community View.’ By contrast, 
‘the dominant concept in Japan corresponds to the Employee Community View.’ The 
                                                 
88 ibid., p. 19. 
89 ibid. 
90 ibid., p. 20. For William Lazonick where exactly the boundaries of this community lie 
constitutes precisely one of the basic characteristics distinguishing British, American and 
Japanese capitalism, where in British capitalism the community is typically limited to senior 
managers, in American capitalism it is extended to include also middle managers, and in 
Japanese capitalism includes all the people who work in the firm, again apart from 
‘peripheral’, i.e. part-time or temporary, workers. See Lazonick, Business Organization and 
the Myth of the Market Economy, op.cit., especially pp. 23-58 (the chapter entitled 
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91 Dore, op.cit., p. 20. 
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arena view he sees first and foremost as ‘one favoured by academic analysts – 
professional economists, business school teachers, etc.’92 
 
Dore also comments that ‘principal-agent theory’ is compatible with both the 
property view and the arena view, and sometimes it may be ‘not incompatible with’ 
the managerial community view. However, it is never compatible with the employee 
community view.93 
 
Correspondingly, the maximising shareholder value perspective on corporate 
governance, conceiving corporate governance as an agency problem where 
shareholders, i.e. owners, are principals and managers are agents, fits into both the 
property view and the arena view. The actors involved in the firm are indeed seen as 
exclusively self-interested, concerned exclusively with furthering their own interests. 
At the same time, this is explicitly seen from the point of view of how to further the 
interests of one particular group of actors, namely owners or shareholders. Partly this 
position rests on an assumption that the legal situation with regard to ownership 
adequately represents social reality, as Dore observes. But perhaps more importantly, 
as we have seen this position has a very explicit theoretical justification connected to 
the alleged the optimality properties of the perfect market economy: shareholders are 
seen as ‘residual claimants,’ consequently maximizing the profit of the firm implies 
maximizing shareholder value, and an optimal allocation of economic resources 
presupposes that firms are profit maximizers. 
 
However, as we have also seen, there serious doubts concerning the relevance of the 
model of the perfect market economy as a measuring rod for real economic 
processes. Thus, to the extent that one has such doubts, the question of the economic 
function of shareholders and the importance to attach to shareholder interests 
becomes an open one. For instance, from the perspective of the enterprise 
community view of the firm, the interests of shareholders are not a central concern. 
On the contrary, according to Dore, in this view ‘the shareholders are just one of the 
groups of outsiders who have to be taken into account for the community to survive 
and prosper.’94 
Governance, innovation and organisational intergration 
From a perspective explicitly concerned with dynamics and production, and not 
primarily with equilibrium and exchange, it becomes an important question what 
kinds of views of the firm are fruitful for understanding innovative firms. This 
requires getting a grasp of the basic characteristics of innovation processes. On the 
background of the literature on the economics of innovation, Mary O’Sullivan 
proposes a stylized characterization of innovation as a process that is, in addition to 
cumulative and uncertain, also collective.95 Thus the importance Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan attach to organizational integration,96 the integration of different kinds of 
employees in the organization. This is connected to Simon’s point that in a 
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successful organization, employees identify with the organization: they internalize 
the organization’s goals, make them their own.97 These arguments suggest that some 
version of the entity / community view of the firm may be the most fruitful for 
grasping the nature of innovative firms. 
 
Multiple identifications and loyalties 
However, we should also take into account that there is not only here a question of 
the degree and manner of integration of different groups of actors in the firm in 
question. People working for a given firm will also be more or less integrated in 
other kinds of collective entities, internalizing in various manner and degree the 
perspectives and orientations and objectives of these other entities. These different 
orientations will partly reinforce one another, partly be in conflict, etc. People’s 
identity, loyalties and commitments only partly refer to the firm they are working for. 
To a large extent, and in varying degrees, people have their identities defined also 
elsewhere. The Japanese case is perhaps extreme in that employees’ identities and 
whole lives are in a very high degree tied to the company they work for. Discussing 
so-called lean production in Japanese firms, Wolfgang Streeck claims that ‘it 
depends on workers making themselves freely available to the organization in a way 
that cannot be expected in a pluralist social structure.’98 By contrast, ‘in a society 
such as Germany, where workers do not primarily identify with their place of 
employment, involvement of individuals in secondary organizations of work must be 
negotiated, protecting workers’ “privacy” from being consumed by requirements of 
organizational efficiency. Reliable and enforceable demarcations of rights and 
responsibilities, in particular of managerial power, is felt to be indispensable as a 
brake on what in a pluralist environment is perceived as a totalitarian tendency of 
organizations under competitive pressures to absorb their members.’99 
 
Thus, there is nothing absolute about the boundaries delimiting a firm or an 
organization. People working in an organization will not only be more or less 
integrated in the organization in question, but in different ways and degrees in other 
kinds of social entities, carrying with them commitments to and orientations of these 
other types of entities into the organization. This will influence how they interpret 
the goals of the organization, how they see their own role, how they see conflicts of 
interests, etc. 
 
In short, people associated with an organization will have loyalties to the wider 
society which the organization is a part of, along several important dimensions, for 
instance according to social class, profession, or local community. 
 
Owners, managers – an elite 
Owners and managers, especially large owners and managers of large firms, will 
tend to be members of the same broad social class, the capitalist class or the 
propertied class. They will tend to be socialized into the same kind of social values 
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and have the same kind of outlook, an important component of which is to see their 
own positions as leaders in society as natural. The unity of class is not based solely 
on similar social position and socialization to similar social values. In general, as 
Mark Granovetter argues, to a large extent ‘business relations are mixed up with 
social ones.’100 Trade associations are of great importance. Furthermore, ‘that 
business relations spill over into sociability and vice versa, especially among 
business elites, is one of the best-documented facts in the sociological study of 
business.’101 Another important phenomenon is the fact that many firms ‘are linked 
by interlocking directorates so that relationships among directors of firms are many 
and densely knit.’102 C. Wright Mills, in his classic study of ‘the power elite’ in 
American society, argued that the ‘growth and interconnections of the corporations’ 
had resulted in ‘the rise of a more sophisticated executive elite which now possesses 
a certain autonomy from any specific property interest. Its power is the power of 
property, but that property is not always or even usually of one coherent and narrow 
type. It is, in operating fact, class-wide property.’103 Mills saw the phenomenon of 
‘interlocking directorships’ as a central part of this picture: ‘”Interlocking 
Directorate” is no mere phrase: it points to a solid feature of the facts of business life, 
and to a sociological anchor of the community of interest, the unification of outlook 
and policy, that prevails among the propertied class.’104 What these relationships 
between different sections of the capitalist class look like will have consequences for 
how unitary or fragmented the class will be, which fractions of the class will be 
dominating, etc. These relationships will vary with time and place, for instance 
among countries.105 
 
Employee organisations 
On the labour side the conditions of organizational integration will depend, among 
other things, on the character of labour unions, which in its turn will reflect wider 
social relations. Let us again refer to Wolfgang Streeck’s discussion of contrasts 
between Germany and Japan. In Japan, labour unions are ‘company unions that 
represent workers tied to their employer in a company “community of fate”.’106 
Thus, ‘Japanese unions are part of a unitary, monistic company structure designed to 
support the shared interests of management and of a “committed,” “dedicated” work 
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force in the firm’s economic success.’107 In Germany, by contrast, social identities 
and identifications are to a much lesser extent than in Japan linked to a particular 
firm. According to Streeck, ‘the collective interests attached to such identities require 
representation by unions organized outside and above individual companies, at the 
level of industries or the country as a whole. While these could be craft unions, it so 
happens that in the German case they are political-industrial unions each of which 
organizes and represents not just one occupation but a large number of them.’108 
Accordingly, ‘political-industrial unions of the German kind exercise influence on 
firms by bringing to bear on them power mobilized in the public sphere, outside the 
private sphere of the firm.’109 In Japan, on the other hand, the firm is not to the same 
degree confronted by an independent public sphere. On the contrary, in the Japanese 
case one finds ‘an astounding capacity of firms to enlist the support of informal 
structures and community values for organizational control.’110 
 
Professional loyalties 
People working in a firm may also to an important extent have their identities linked 
to a specific profession. The standards they acknowledge in their work may largely 
be professional, reinforced through interaction with other members of their own 
profession, in networks which largely cut across the boundaries of firms. The 
professional networks will also be important as sources of information, as fora for 
discussion of policy, etc. What kinds of professions dominate in different parts of the 
economy may be an important characteristic distinguishing different economies. 
Among the factors influencing this will be the characteristics of the educational 
systems in different countries.111 
 
The local community 
Also people’s integration in and loyalties to a local community may in important 
ways condition the way they are integrated into specific firms. As Charles F. Sabel 
claims in a discussion of the ‘new industrial districts’ (for instance, in Emilia-
Romagna, Veneto, Baden-Württemberg, etc.), ‘markets in the new industrial districts 
are “socially constructed” in that they form “productive communities” which limit 
competition to encourage innovation by means of “social pacts”.’112 He also speaks 
of a tendency to the ‘reconsolidation of the region as an integrated unit of 
production’ from the 1970’s and onwards.113 There then comes the question of how 
to understand these regional economies, as ‘a negotiated alliance of fundamentally 
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distinct groups, or as integral communities with a fluid but discernable division of 
labour?’114 
 
The firm in society 
In general, then, different interests and perspectives from the wider society will be 
present also inside the individual firms, making the organizational integration into 
the firm not simply a question of integrating individuals qua individuals, but of 
integrating individuals qua members of different classes, professions, subcultures, 
etc., thus also of reconciling or at least neutralizing conflicting interests and 
perspectives of different social groups. This is perhaps especially evident in 
Germany, where the internal life of business firms is explicitly treated as a matter of 
public concern. In the words of Wolfgang Streeck, ‘German society treats the 
internal life of an enterprise as a matter of public interest and subjects it to public 
intervention and regulation. Firms in Germany are in this way part of a politically 
constructed and legitimized public order consisting of a wide array of formally 
institutionalized and accountable mechanisms of governance, foremost among them 
an “enabling” democratic state, centralized industrial unions and employers 
associations, chambers of industry with obligatory membership for firms, and works 
councils.’115 However, even where the internal life of the enterprise is not explicitly 
an object of public intervention and regulation as in Germany, i.e. even when the 
public interest in the internal life of the enterprise is not sanctioned by the state, it 
seems evident that the balance of forces within the enterprise, and thereby the actual 
functioning of the enterprises, through the compromises made, their materialization 
in institutional arrangements and practices, etc., will be affected by the balance of 
forces in society at large. Among other things, the nature and strength of labour 
unions will be of importance here. In this connection it will also matter whether there 
is a climate of cooperation between social classes, where one has some kind of 
shared vision of contributing towards a common social good, or whether the 
relationship between the classes is more dominated by antagonism and distrust. This 
will partly be a question of whether any social class or class fraction or coalition of 
forces is able to assume leadership and formulate a vision of the good life or of social 
progress which large sections of society are willing to support. This, in turn, will be 
related to the levels of inequality in society, etc. Concerning the German case, it 
might be said that the very fact of having the internal life of enterprises recognized as 
a matter of public interest already says something about the balance of power in 
society. 
 
The historical background: the institutional arrangements underlying post-war 
growth 
The reference here to the balance of power between social classes and groups, and 
social institutions in which compromises between these forces are materialized, 
points to an important background for the recent concern with maximizing 
shareholder value as the prime objective of corporate governance. This concern is 
very much part of the neo-liberal reaction against the elaborate institutional 
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structures built up in the advanced capitalist economies in the course of the post-
World War II period. Post-war economic growth, stability and prosperity rested on 
these elaborate institutional arrangements, regulating and giving direction to market 
processes.116 Price competition was limited. Both final and intermediate product 
markets were organized according to oligopolistic competition, where ‘price wars 
were replaced by gentlemen’s agreements between large firms which adopted mark-
up price formation and cosmetic product differentiation.’117 Money and credit were 
thoroughly regulated: ‘The Keynesian revolution taught that a stable monetary 
regime was a public good to be provided by a central bank along with complex 
regulations imposed on commercial banks and financial institutions.’118 Also wage 
formation was to a large extent mediated through complex institutional arrangements 
(collective agreements, long-term contracting, etc.). Central to the post war order was 
a compromise between capital and labour, where wage-earners received a proportion 
of productivity growth through in the form of rising real wages, through ‘indexation 
of nominal wages with respect to consumer prices along with productivity sharing 
schemes,’ in exchange for not interfering with managers’ rights to organize 
production and labour processes.’119 Important was also the extension of the welfare 
state, which meant that also people temporarily or permanently unable to earn a 
living remained consumers.120 
 
The neo-liberal reaction 
This whole set of institutional arrangements has come under attack since the 
beginning of the 1970s. During the 1970s growth became slower and more unstable, 
and a number of structural problems of the developed economies received 
widespread attention, with a consequent widely perceived need for structural change. 
For a number of writers within the neoclassical tradition of economic theory, the 
fundamental reason for these structural problems were seen to be a number of 
'rigidities' which distort the workings of the market economy.121 The basis for this 
view is the fundamental assumption of neoclassical theory that in a perfectly 
functioning free market, flexibility is assured through the price mechanism, the 
outcome ideally being an 'optimal' allocation of resources at every point in time. 
Among the phenomena held responsible for creating 'rigidities' which distort the 
workings of the market are notably state intervention, the welfare state, the power of 
labour unions and of the labour movement more generally. Not only do these 
'disturbing' forces make the price signals deviate more and more from those that a 
'perfect' market would produce, they also contribute to making the various economic 
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actors less responsive to such signals.122 Thus, for many a top priority became to 
promote structural change through deregulation, the fight against 'rigidities' and 
instead increased reliance on 'the market'. Significantly, this also to a large extent 
became an essential element of governmental policy in different countries in the 
1980s.123 For many the 'rigidities' in the labour market have come to be perceived as 
the principal cause of structural problems and stagnation.124 These 'rigidities' have 
typically been understood in terms of the collective conventions and legal regulations 
governing the wage contracts, in particular arrangements interfering with the rights 
of employers to dismiss their employees.125 According to this view, top priority 
should be given to increasing 'labour flexibility' by attacking these legal regulations 
and the bargaining power of labour, thus weakening the contractual and legal 
attachments of the employees to their particular firms and enterprises.  
 
Thus, the dominant concern of neo-liberal reaction against the elaborate institutional 
arrangements built up since the second world war is with establishing or restoring the 
discipline of the market, with making economic actors maximally responsive to 
market signals. We have seen that this is precisely the point of the concern with 
maximizing shareholder value as the major principle of corporate governance: to get 
profit-maximizing firms requires making managers act in accordance with the 
interests of shareholders or oweners, i.e. the ‘residual claimants.’ Given the central 
premise of this tradition of economic thought that economic actors are motivared 
solely by the prospect of personal economic gain, this means aligning the private 
interests of managers with the interests of shareholders through stock-options to 
managers, etc. 
 
From ‘mixed economy’ to ’profit  maxization’  
Thus, even in the so-called Anglo-Saxon economies of the USA and Britain, where 
the ideology of maximizing shareholder value has been strongest, ‘the exclusive 
focus of corporations on shareholder value is a relatively recent phenomenon.’126 
According to Lazonick and O’Sullivan, this focus rose ‘to prominence in the 1980s 
as part and parcel of the Reaganite and Thatcherite revolutions.’127 Correspondingly, 
in the words of Ronald Dore, ‘Anglo-Saxon capitalism has not always assumed its 
thorough-going, neo-liberal form.’128 Dore claims that 25 years ago, most people in 
Britain accepted the term ‘mixed economy’ as an accurate characterization of the 
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world they lived in. The term ‘mixed economy’ not only referred to the economy at 
large as a mixture of different institutional arrangements, combining markets and 
non-market arrangements, but also implied an acknowledgement ‘that people worked 
for a mixture of motives, some more for personal profit, some more for public 
service.’129 This extended to a recognition that ‘those who managed corporations 
should also have mixed motives, mixed objectives, not just that of profit 
maximization. They should acknowledge that they had obligations not only to 
shareholders, but also to those who would later become known as stakeholders,’130 
i.e. all involved in the running of the firm and being affected by its dispositions and 
actions, ultimately the local community and society at large. 
 
Similarly, Mary O’Sullivan discusses the justification for managerial rule in the 
context of the US economy especially after the second world war.131 She notes that 
the ideology that corporations were run in the interests of the shareholders was 
strong, and that it lived on after the war. However, ‘the separation of ownership and 
control in many of the nation’s leading corporations made it increasingly clear that 
managers’ characterization of themselves as shareholder-designates was unrealistic 
as well as coy.’132 Instead, with the growing importance of big corporations, a view 
of corporate managers as ‘trustees for society as a whole’ gained ground, and after 
the war ‘corporate managers increasingly represented themselves as “socially 
responsible”.’133 O’Sullivan emphasizes that the view of corporate managers as 
trustees for society was not simply a view which managers had of themselves, but 
was broadly accepted, subscribed to also by ‘journalists, writers, and scholars of the 
corporation in the post-war period.’134 She notes, however, that this widely accepted 
view of the social responsibilities of managers was not reflected in corporate law.135 
 
Connected to the changing view of managers and their responsibilities there also 
seems to have been a change in the view of the enterprise as an institution. In an 
article from 1986 on the US economy, Michel Aglietta claims that the enterprise as 
an institution has a very high prestige and legitimacy in the USA.136 This is so 
because large parts of the population in the enterprise see a ‘reconciliation between 
individual initiative and cooperation, between the chances of social promotion and 
membership in a group,’137 which Aglietta claims are basic values in American 
culture. Thus, ‘in American culture, the enterprise is more than an economic 
organization. It is a place of social integration,’ and well suited as an institutional 
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background for the pursuit of ‘individual accomplishment in accordance with the 
rules of competition for monetary gain.’138 
 
A change in ideological climate 
Thus, it is primarily in the course of the last 25 years that the view that maximizing 
shareholder value should be the dominant principle of corporate governance, and 
with it the underlying assumption that economic actor are in effect motivated only by 
the prospect of personal economic gain (and the fear of personal economic loss),139 
has risen to prominence. This has first and foremost been the case in the USA and 
Britain, but in the last few years these ideas have gained influence also in continental 
European countries, and even in Japan. Lazonick and O’Sullivan are highly critical 
of these developments and of the theoretical ideas justifying them. They challenge 
the claim that maximizing shareholder value will result in the highest common good, 
and instead claim that the rise of shareholder value as a principle of corporate 
governance in the USA has been closely tied to a ‘transformation of US corporate 
strategy from an orientation towards retention of corporate earnings and reinvestment 
in corporate growth through the 1970s to one of downsizing of corporate labour 
forces and distribution of corporate earnings to shareholders over the last two 
decades.’140  
 
The causal relationships involved here are many and complex. These are matters 
which have been extensively discussed in books and articles by Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan. We cannot go into this in any detail here, and will only try to sum up 
some of the main points of their story. During the hegemony of the strategy of retain 
and reinvest, up through the 1970s, ‘managers tended to be integrated with the 
business organizations that employed them and governed the corporate enterprises 
that they controlled accordingly.’141 Their salaried compensation was ‘largely 
determined by pay structures within the managereial organization.’142 However, 
forces were at work which ‘increasingly segmented top managers of US corporations 
from the rest of the managerial organization.’143 Stock options for top managers 
became more common, while at the same time the pay of top managers started to 
grow more rapidly ‘than the pay of everyone else in the corporation. During the 
1980s and 1990s the explosion in top management pay has continued unabated, with 
stock-based rewards playing an ever more important role.’144 Thus, top managers 
more and more came to ‘align their own interests with external financial interests 
rather than with the interests of the productive organizations over which they 
exercised control.’145 Managers thus ‘developed an ever-growing personal interest in 
boosting the market value of their companies’ stock.’146 In general, ‘the demands of 
financial interests to reap high returns’ gaine in importance relative to ‘the needs of 
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companies to improve their productive capabilities.’147 Behind these developments 
were such phenomena as the rise of powerful institutional investors, the rise of a 
market for corporate control, etc. The growing importance of financial interests to 
reap high returns also means a growing pressure for financial liquidity, at the 
expense of financial commitment. This is unfavourable to innovation, since financial 
commitment is a precondition for the development and utilization of productive 
resources on the basis of organizational learning which is central to innovation.148 
This is some of the background for the ‘new regime’ where ‘top managers downsize 
the corporations they comntrol, with a particular emphasis on cutting the size of the 
labour forces they employ, in an attempt to increase the return on equity.’149 
 
Thus, according to O’Sullivan, with the growing importance of financial interests to 
reap high returns, and the institutional changes accompanying these developments, 
there came to be set in motion ‘a dynamic that was, in its origins and its momentum, 
distinct from the real economy.’150 This in particular was evident during the 1980s, 
which O’Sullivan refers to as ‘the Deal Decade’, where ‘the challenge of developing 
and utilizing productive resources paled into insignificance beside the hubris of 
making deals.’151 The rise to prominence of the principle of maximizing shareholder 
value thus did not have the benign effects that its proponents claimed. According to 
O’Sullivan, the real import of these developments lay elsewhere, at a more 
ideological level, affecting the norms and standards guiding people’s actions. Her 
conclusion is that the ‘true significance’ of the ‘Deal Decade’ was that ‘it 
transformed the notion of what was legitimate for one person or a small group of 
people to extract from US corporate enterprises.’152 Formerly, even though corporate 
executives had earned incomes which were several times higher than the people they 
managed, ‘they had nevertheless been structured by the logic of building and 
sustaining an organization. During the 1980s, however, corporate executives began 
to realize that they could breake free of the long-term logic of the organizations 
which they controlled to the extent that they were willing to exploit, as individuals, 
the positions which they had won through their success within the organization.’153 
 
Misunderstanding the foundations of a market economy: The critique of Tobin 
and Stiglitz 
These developments point to basic shortcomings in the mainstream, neoclassical 
understanding of the functioning of markets and economic systems. As James Tobin 
warns in a critical discussion of Western economic advisers recipes for the transition 
to a market economy in Russia, ‘there are perils to counting too heavily on the 
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beneficient results of unmitigated self-interest.’154 Understanding the institutional 
context is essential here: ‘The market system works within social institutions that 
channel and guide self-interested energies into constructive activities.’155 As 
Marshall Pomer emphasizes, trust and cooperatioan are central ingredients of well-
functioning economic arrangements: ‘The neoclassical paradigm, extolling the 
benefits of unbridled self-interest, bolsters an individualistic ethic that can impede 
the functioning of the market. Without a culture that fosters trust and cooperation, 
potential market transactions, including long-term contractual arrangements, are 
stifled.’156 He adds that ‘an individual who, in accordance with the neoclassical 
paradigm, is concerned exclusively with his or her own self-interest is not 
trustworthy.’157 Also Tobin makes it clear that the question of social institutions 
cannot be reduced to a question of designing clever incentive schemes which make 
compliance with social norms and values a matter of self-interest, claiming that ‘a 
civilized society cannot survive if obedience to laws and other social norms becomes 
solely a matter of self-interest. It cannot survive, for example, if people pay taxes 
only if hedonistic calculus reveals that the probability-discounted penalty of being 
caught exceeds the probability-discounted gain from the violation.’158 Tobin also 
reminds us that perspectives on human action are not simply descriptions which may 
be more or less accurate or correct as such. To the extent that they are accepted as 
reasonable accounts of human action by the actors themselves, they are themselves 
part of the institutional context, giving standards and guidance for action. Thus, ‘the 
glorification of self-interested behavior and the denigration of government in recent 
years bear some responsibility for recent trends.’159 As a summary of the above 
arguments we may quote Joseph Stiglitz, who claims that ‘the success of a market 
economy cannot be understood in terms of narrow economic incentives: norms, 
social institutions, social capital, and trust play critical roles.’160 Failure to grasp 
these points he characterizes as ‘misunderstanding of the very foundations of a 
market economy.’161 
 
The assumption of rationality as narrowly instrumental 
We should also point out that in the neoclassical perspective the economic actor is 
not only depicted as motivated exclusively by self-interest. Closely related to this is 
the assumption is that human action is instrumental in a narrow sense, that we will 
only perform an action, engage in a project, if the expected benefits resulting from 
our activity exceed the costs represented by the efforts of engaging in the activity.  
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Investing for the future: Keynes on animal spirits 
It is far from obvious that this is a reasonable assumption. Keynes was convinced 
that human activity, especially activity consisting of investment for the future, whose 
consequences will only materialize some time in the future, was inexplicable if 
understood as purely instrumental, as simply a cost which will be incurred only if 
exceeded by the benefits resulting from the action. To account adequately for human 
action we must thus not see it as motivated only by expected consequences, but also 
as supported by a primary urge to activity in human beings, by what Keynes called 
‘animal spirits’: ‘Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full 
consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken 
as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and 
not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by 
quantitative probabilities.’162 Keynes claims that mathematical expectation simply 
does not have a solid enough foundation here: ‘human decisions affecting the future, 
whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical 
expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist;’ 
consequently, ‘it is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round.’163 
This suggests that it is important build and sustain an institutional environment 
which allows animal spirits to thrive: ‘Thus if animal spirits are dimmed and the 
spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical 
expectation, enterprise will fade and die.’164 
 
Lester Thurow on human beings as social builders  
A similar argument is made by Lester Thurow. He claims that ‘human beings are 
social builders who can get direct benefits – utility – from building,’165 a view which 
is ‘completely left out of standard economic theory.’166 Building, he contends, ‘is a 
process of creation, and humans are by nature creative.’167 However, how individuals 
will in actual fact value building ‘depends upon their social conditioning.’168 The 
dominant ideology in America today, he claims, is not favourable to building. On the 
contrary, ‘all our social conditioning is now leading not just toward toward the 
primacy of individual consumption but toward the view that nothing else matters at 
all.’169 This comes on top of what he claims is a built-in tendency of capitalism ‘to 
save and invest too little.’170 Thurow thus claims that ‘building must be seen not just 
as an investment made to increase future consumption but as an end in and of 
itself.’171 This requires that an ideology extolling investment be invented and 
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sustained: ‘Urges to build have to be supported so that they are at least coequal with 
urges to consume.’172 
 
Understanding motivation: extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
This is closely related to the question of the motivation of employees and of 
economic actors more generally, which we discussed above in relation to the 
perspectives of, especially, Herbert Simon. In an article summing up research on the 
question of variable pay for performance, Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey point to 
the central distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.173 Extrinsic 
motivation obtains when an activity is performed in order to get something else, i.e. 
some external reward, in practice money. This is, in effect, the only type of 
motivation acknowledged in mainstream economic thought, and is the view of 
motivation which justifies the view that employees’ pay be linked to performance.174 
Intrinsic motivation means that the activity is undertaken for its own sake or because 
one believes that the result of the activity is important. This may relate to a ‘self-
defined goal, such as, for example, climbing a mountain, or to the obligations of 
personal and social identities.175 One may be concerned about the contribution one’s 
activity makes to community, and one may also simply find the task one is set to 
perform challenging and interesting, become absorbed in the problems needing to be 
solved in order to accomplish the task, etc. Intrinsic motivation is, of course, the type 
of motivation involved when Herbert Simon emphasizes the identification of 
employees with the goals of the firm, pride in one’s work among employees, etc., 
without which it becomes inexplicable why ‘many workers, perhaps most, exert 
more than minimally enforceable effort.’176 
 
The conclusions which Osterloh and Frey refer may be summed up as follows. 
Extrinsic motivation is sufficient for some work. More specifically, extrinsic 
motivation, and thus variable pay for performance, is ‘adequate only for simple jobs,’ 
‘when the work is routinized and the performance is easy to measure.’177 By contrast, 
for complex and novel tasks, of the kind which are ‘a typical feature of knowledge-
intensive companies which today comprise the most rapidly growing segment of the 
economy,’ requiring involvement and creativity, intrinsic motivation is crucial.178 
However, the conclusion here is not simply that extrinsic motivation is insufficient in 
the latter cases, thus in need of being supplemented by intrinsic motivation. The 
conclusion is much stronger than this. The relationship between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation is not additive. ‘Rather, there is a systematic dynamic 
relationship between the two,’ referred to as ‘crowding effects.’179 Particularly, 
‘monetary compensation can crowd out intrinsic motivation’180 and thus ‘undermine 
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employees efforts.’ Reward systems such as variable pay for performance and 
bonuses thus ‘ususally, but not always, make employees lose interest in the 
immediate goal’ and accordingly ‘lower their performance.’181 Furthermore, 
‘monetary incentives in complex and novel tasks tend to produce stereotyped 
repetition.’182 
 
These conclusions are backed by a large number of empirical studies, both 
experimental and field studies.183 Thus, the crowding-out effect ‘provides a possible 
explanation for the overwhelming empirical evidence that there is no significant 
connection between pay and performance, except for simple jobs’ – and even in the 
latter case the literature is full of counter examples.’184 Furthermore, these insights 
have strong support from theoretical arguments. For instance, ‘according to cognitive 
evaluation theory intrinsic motivation is substituted by an external intervention 
which is perceived as a restriction to act autonomously. The locus of control shifts 
from inside to outside the person. The person in question no longer feels responsible 
but rather attributes responsibility to the person undertaking the outside 
intervention.’185 These arguments are quite compatible with the arguments 
concerning trust which we have discussed earlier in this paper. 
 
To these problems are added the well known distorsions introduced by measurement 
problems. Actors focus on the indicators used to measure the results, which may 
more or less accurately reflect what one is really after, and they focus on rewarded 
aspects of the job, neglecting the unrewarded ones.186 Not least there is the problem 
of identifying individual contributions in cases where products largely are the results 
of collective efforts and processes. 
 
To sum up these arguments, ‘intrinsic motivation is needed for tasks that require 
creativity; in contrast, extrinsically motivated persons tend to produce stereotyped 
repetition of what already works.’187 In addition, intrinsic motivation is crucial, and 
extrinsic motivation dysfunctional, in relation to learning and the transfer of tacit 
knowledge.188 
 
The above arguments seem quite devastating for the view that incentive schemes to 
control managers and assure that they act in the interests of shareholders are a 
requisite for a sound system of corporate governance – unless, that is, one should 
consider what managers do as ‘simple jobs.’ (Which, incidentally, is precisely what 
Kirzner, among others, claims that neoclassical theory in effect assumes, as we saw 
above.) 
 
Thus, instead of presupposing what Stiglitz calls ‘the economists’standard incentives 
paradigm,’189 thus severely restricting the range of questions which it becomes 
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possible to ask by in effect simply assuming that motivation is extrinsic, Osterloh 
and Frey claim that an important task becomes to understand the conditions for 
producing ‘the right balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.’190 This also 
implies coming to grips with intrinsic motivation, what conditions favour it, how it 
can be supported. This has much to do with communication and dialogue, with 
organizational learning, with cooperation, participation and co-determination, with 
self-determination and responsibility.191 In general, the question of intrinsic 
motivation in a particularly clear way points to the need to see firms and other 
organizations as collective entities, where the people involved are seen as members 
of these collective entities – although, as pointed out above, also at the same time 
members of other social entities, with complex relationships among these different 
social entities.192 This raises a number of important questions, for instance 
concerning conditions for membership, the importance of fairness and justice,193 the 
nature of authority and leadership, the central question of legitimacy, etc. 
 
 
Implications of the rejection of the neoclassical incentives paradigm 
In this paper we have discussed the recent concern with the issue of corporate 
governance. We have seen that this concern has been driven and dominated by a 
view that the principle of corporate governance should be to maximize shareholder 
value. The issue of corporate governance has thus been restricted to the relationship 
between shareholders and managers, where the dominating problem is seen to be 
how to make managers act in the interests of the shareholders. 
 
We have also seen that this conception of what corporate governance is all about 
rests on quite specific assumptions, namely neoclassical ideas about the optimality 
characteristics of the perfect market economy, with the underlying assumptions that 
economic actors are exclusively self-interested and thus motivated only by the 
prospect of pesonal economic gain. We have discussed these assumptions quite 
extensively, and argued that there is ample reason to have serious reservations 
against them. 
 
Once one has major reservations against these assumptions and thus rejects the idea 
of using ‘the theory of the perfect market economy ... as the benchmark for economic 
efficiency,’194 there is no longer any basis for restricting corporate governance to a 
relationship between owners (shareholders) and managers, or more generally 
between ‘principals’ represented by owners (shareholders) and ‘agents’ represented 
in principle not only by managers but by everyone which the nominal owner is seen 
to employ to perform the tasks necessary to run the enterprise. 
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With this restriction of the field of enquiry rejected, there then opens up a large array 
of questions and problems potentially relevant for the issue of corporate governance. 
If this issue is not simply to cover a multitude of questions which are vaguely 
relevant to how business firms are governed and function, one needs an organizing 
theoretical perspective which guides research and points out why and in which ways 
different questions are important and relevant and thus worth investigating more 
closely 
 
Outline of an alternative view – Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
 
In the literature explicitly addressing the issue of corporate governance there has, 
according to Mary O’Sullivan, in effect only been one contender to the maximizing 
shareholder value perspective, namely what has been known as the ‘stakeholder’ 
perspective.195 Stakeholders are everyone with a stake in the enterprise, i.e., in 
addition to shareholders and managers, also employees, consumers, suppliers, the 
local community, etc. The stakeholder perspective is also concerned with the 
allocation of resources, but argues that the interests of other stakeholders besides 
shareholders should also be taken into account. The stakeholder perspective is, 
according to O’Sullivan, much less theoretically groundes than the shareholder 
perspective, indeed, it is ‘more often expounded as a political position than as an 
economic theory of governance.’196 This perspective thus risks simply becoming ‘a 
de facto theory of corporate welfare,’ easily encouraging ‘the entrenchment of the 
claims of economic actors who have participated in and benefitted from wealth 
creation in the past, even when the integration of their skills is no longer a viable 
basis on which the economy can generate the returns to meet these claims.’197 
O’Sullivan mentions the work of Margaret Blair as one of the few within this 
perspective (she calls it an ‘exception’) which bases its reasoning on explicit 
economic analysis. Blair’s work, however, also uses neoclassical ideas of residual 
risk and residual claimants: employees invest their ‘human capital’ in firm-specific 
skills, and are thus also in effect ‘residual claimants.’198 This perspective also, like 
the neoclassical perspective, considers resource allocation only as rewards to 
individuals, which ‘precludes an understanding of the economic foundations of 
strategic control by one group of people over the learning opportunities of others.’199 
 
Focus on innovation 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan instead propose what they call an organizational control 
theory of corporate governance. The theoretical perspective is here oriented towards 
coming to grips with the innovative firm; it thus has to be based on a theoretical 
understanding of innovation processes. Instead of a theory of corporate governance 
based on the idea that the essence of economic success consists in constrained 
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maximization, where firms take products and their prices as given data, Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan claim that to grasp capitalist development we need a theory of the 
innovative enterprise, constantly aiming at supplying ‘higher-quality products at 
lower unit costs.’200 They thus propose an organizational control perspective on 
corporate governance. Developing innovations necessitates a sustained commitment 
of resources over a considerable period of time, and the outcome of the effort is 
uncertain. They claim that a system of corporate governance which is to support 
innovation must generate three conditions: ‘financial commitment, organizational 
integration, and insider control.’ These are needed for, respectively, ‘1) the 
commitment of resources to irreversible investments with uncertain returns; 2) the 
integration of human and physical resources into an organizational process to 
develop and utilize technology; and 3) the vesting of strategic control within 
corporations in the hands of those with the incentives and abilities to allocate 
resources to innovative investments.’ These conditions ‘support organizational 
control in contrast to market control over the critical inputs to the innovation 
process: knowledge and money.’201 
 
The role of commitment of resources 
The importance here attached to commitment (financial commitment, commitment of 
resources) contrasts sharply with the orthodox ideas of market coordination as the 
superior form of economic coordination. The orthodox theory assumes opportunistic 
actors, constantly on the search for the highest possible returns from their 
investments. Commitment, on the other hand, fundamentally implies some form of 
curtailment or suspension or limitation of opportunism. This, however, to the 
orthodox perspective appears as irrationality, something which hinders the smooth 
and efficient working of the market mechanism. From the perspective of Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, on the other hand, this confirms the orthodox theory’s almost 
exclusive preoccupation with how resources and returns are allocated at a point in 
time, and the consequent failure to focus on the question of how resources are 
developed and utilized over time.202 Thus, as O’Sullivan comments, ‘from the 
perspective of innovation, the most critical “market imperfections” that conventional 
economists cite – imperfection in financial markets, labour markets, and product 
markets – may not be imperfections at all but rather improvements in social 
organization that foster technological innovation and economic development.’203 
 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan thus claim that from the perspective of the development of 
resources over time organizational allocation of resources tends to be superior to 
market allocation of resources. This is furthermore closely connected to Lazonick’s 
critique of the neoclassical characterization of modern capitalist economies as 
‘market economies.’ Although ‘market exchange remains a distinctive feature of 
advanced capitalist economies,’ Lazonick claims, ‘the historical experience of 
capitalist development demonstrates the growing importance of organizational 
coordination relative to market coordination in the value-creation process.’204 This, 
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in essence, is also a point made Herbert Simon. He questions why we should call our 
economies ‘market economies’ at all, and suggests that ‘organizational economy’ 
would be a better term, ‘with market relations among organizations.’205 
 
Again we should remember that this issue is not only one of the respective 
importance of markets in relation to other types of institutions and arrangements, but 
also of the very conception of what markets themselves are all about and how they 
function. 
 
A comparative perspective  
In general, as Richard Nelson emphasizes, ‘once the optimality argument falls away, 
there would seem to be no way to avoid comparing how market organization 
performs against alternative structures.’206 However, ‘modern market capitalism (or 
any plausible alternative system) is very complex and variegated,’207 and market 
organization thus comes in many different forms. So rather, once arguments based on 
the optimality of the model of the perfect market economy are rejected as invalid or 
irrelevant, there is no way to avoid comparative empirical investigation of different 
institutional arrangements, implying comparing different forms of market 
organizations, different ways markets are embedded in wider social structures, 
different norms and standards guiding the orientation of market participants, etc. 
Modern capitalist economies are highly complex institutional structures, and these 
institutonal structures also vary considerably across economies.208 Different 
institutional arrangements will have different strengths and weaknesses, for instance 
in different regards, in different kinds of situations, in different kinds of production, 
different ways of organizing economic activity may be more or less suited to 
different kinds of cultures,209 etc. 
Implications for the analysis of Norwegian governance institutions  
The above discussion provides a background for the analysis of Norwegian corporate 
governance institutional arrangements. Rejecting the neoclassical optimality 
argument and the corresponding reduction of corporate governance to an agency 
problem, we are left with a perspective emphasizing a much more empirically 
grounded analysis of different institutional arrangements. This perspective must in 
essence be comparative. The description of analysis of institutional arrangements 
must be done with a view to compare the performance of different kinds of 
institutional arrangements under different circumstances. The theoretical background 
will be the kinds of critical contributions referred to in support of our argumentation 
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above. The contributions of Lazonick and O’Sullivan will be central here, but also 
many other contributions will be highly relevant. For even if, as O’Sullivan claims, 
in the literature explicitly addressing the issue of corporate governance there is not 
much to build on if one is critical of the shareholder value perspective dominating 
this literature, there are many highly relevant contributions outside of the literature 
explicitly addressing the issue of corporate governance. These range from studies of 
organizations to studies addressing economic governance issues more generally. 
 
Of special interest are theoretical traditions stressing the embeddedness of economic 
mechanisms in broader institutional arrangements and the diversity of institutional 
arrangements across countries and regions and their variation across time, such as the 
contributions by, for instance, Ronald Dore and Wolfgang Streeck referred to 
above.210 One tradition we can mention here is the French regulation school, 
connected to names like Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz.211 
Another, related, tradition, connected to names like J. Rogers Hollingsworth, 
Wolfgang Streeck and John L. Campbell also explicitly addresses the issue of the 
governance of capitalist economies from the perspective of the embeddedness of 
economic mechanisms in broader social institutions.212 The term governance here 
has more or less the same meaning as the term regulation as used within the 
regulation school. The same kind of concern with institutional arrangements is found 
in the writing on regional economies by authors like Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan 
Zeitlin.213 A related, and highly relevant perspective is represented by the work on 
the comparative analysis of business systems by Richard Whitley and associates.214 
Of very high relevance is of course also more micro level studies of firms and of 
organizations more generally, as for instance the work of Herbert Simon. We can 
here also mention the evolutionary perspective on the firm, as developed by authors 
like Nelson and Winter, where firms and organizations are viewed in terms of 
‘packages of routinized competence’ and ‘repositories of productive knowledge and 
arrangements for advancing such knowledge.’215 These are only some of the 
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contributions in the social science literature relevant for the issue of corporate 
governance more broadly conceived. 
 
These and other theoretical perspectives can help us construct dimensions along 
which issues and problems may be identified. 
 
One important dimension here relates to the question of organizational integration, 
central to Lazonick and O’Sullivan’s perspective. To what extent does the economy 
invest in narrow or broad skill bases, to what extent is the economy elitist or 
democratic in this regard? In Dore’s terminology, to what extent do firms conform to 
the managerial community view and to what extent to the employee community 
view? How large part of the work force is reduced to doing simple, repetitive jobs, 
for which extrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives are adequate, labour thus 
having the character of an ordinary ‘factor of production’? How large is the segment 
of the working population who work on complex tasks where intrinsic motivation is 
crucial, thus in effect requiring integration in the organization for which they work? 
Here the USA typically lies towards the elitist pole, Germany and Japan towards the 
democratic. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each of these contrasts? This 
will, among other things, depend on the kind of technology prevailing and on the 
tendencies of technological development, which, again, will vary across industries. 
More generally, the elitist type will allow more short term flexibility, thus being 
better at the destruction part of the process of creative destruction which capitalist 
development implies.216 It may thus be especially well suited to turbulent periods 
with large changes in industrial structures, etc. The more democratic type, will have 
other strengths, perhaps allowing for more cumulativeness and social cohesion, etc. 
We cannot go further into these questions here, but they are important for questions 
of the relationship between corporate governance and economic performance. 
 
Another important dimension relates to what Lazonick and O’Sullivan calls 
‘financial commitment,’ concerning how investments are financed. What is the role 
of the banking system, retained earnings, the stock market, etc. in this regard? Of 
high relevance here will be the balance of power between financial and industrial 
interests in society, etc. 
 
A third dimension relates to the structure of ownership and control. What is the 
relationship between formal ownership and effective control? What does the 
distribution of shares look like, what are the conditions for groups of share owners to 
effectively control companies, etc.? Under this dimension we also get the question of 
to what extent there is what Lazonick and O’Sullivan term ‘insider control,’ i.e., 
strategic control ‘in the hands of those who, as insiders, have the incentives and 
abilities to allocate resources to innovative investments.’217 
 
Here we also get the question of whether and to what extent the concrete identity of 
owners matters. In a Norwegian context this is especially relevant both in relation to 
public ownership and to foreign ownership. Do public owners tend to be more 
socially responsible, more oriented to longer term development? Are foreign owner 
less committed to the particular society where the firm in question is located, and 
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thus more likely to shut down or reduce activity when profit opportunities appear to 
be larger elsewhere? 
 
The issue of the real control of firms also brings in the question of the relationships 
among firms. Firms may in varying degrees be involved in networks of cooperation 
with other firms. As Mark Granovetter argues, they may in varying degrees be 
integrated or bound together, ranging from ‘completely’ to ‘barely at all,’ from 
‘legally consolidated into a single entity’ to ‘bound merely by short-term strategic 
alliances,’ the most interesting cases perhaps being firms bound together at ‘an 
“intermediate” level of binding,’ in which case we have what Granovetter refers to as 
‘business groups.’218 The binding may be more or less formalized, for instance 
according to the degree it involves firms owning shares in other firms. Relationships 
among firms may also in varying degrees be formalized through membership in 
associations. Another important characteristic concerns the equality or inequality of 
the relationships. Are the relationships in question relationships between relatively 
equal partners, or are they relationships based on the dominance of some partners 
over others? And to the extent that the relationships are based on dominance of some 
firms over others, does this domination tend to have a repressive, exploitative 
quality, based primarily on force, or does it rather have the character of hegemonic 
leadership of a more benign, cooperative kind. 
 
An important issue here is to what extent public institutions are involved in these 
kinds of relationships among firms, and, furthermore, to what extent they are 
involved as public authorities. Also cultural conditions, for instance regarding 
attitudes towards entrepreneurship, towards cooperation and authority, etc., will in 
important ways influence what corporate governance institutions will look like. More 
generally, the shaping of corporate governance institutions will crucially depend on 
ideological and political conditions. 
A research and policy agenda 
As argued at length above; as soon as one widens the view from the narrow, 
equilibrium agency-problems there opens up quite another research and policy 
agenda. The overall aim is of couse to maximise social welfare through producing 
goods and services in the most efficient and sustainable way. Doing so one would in 
a way reformulate, give quite new meaning to many of the core concepts of neo-
classical economics. A bit paradoxical one could argue that ‘perfect information’ on 
firm level is reached when all the information of all the employees are utilised to the 
maximum through transparent, interactive, inclusive information systems in each 
firm. That ‘perfect information’ on a societal basis is reached by various mechanism 
of knowledge diffusion taking its starting point: 
 
• The ‘common good’ character of information and knowledge,  
• The importance of trust,  
• Of professional networks.   
• Of information sharing and power structures enhancing the innovative 
capabilities of firms, clusters and society as a whole 
                                                 
218 Mark Granovetter, ‘Coase Revisited: Business Groups in the Modern Economy,’ 
Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 4, Number 1, 1995, pp. 93-130, quoted from p. 
95 and pp. 96-97. 
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• The importance of entrepreneurial culture, of both competition and 
cooperation 
• the attitude of owners and managers to the lower level employees 
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STEP-gruppen ble etablert i 1991 for å forsyne 
beslutningstakere med forskning knyttet til alle 
sider ved innovasjon og teknologisk endring, med 
særlig vekt på forholdet mellom innovasjon, 
økonomisk vekst og de samfunnsmessige 
omgivelser. Basis for gruppens arbeid er 
erkjennelsen av at utviklingen innen vitenskap og 
teknologi er fundamental for økonomisk vekst. Det 
gjenstår likevel mange uløste problemer omkring 
hvordan prosessen med vitenskapelig og 
teknologisk endring forløper, og hvordan denne 
prosessen får samfunnsmessige og økonomiske 
konsekvenser. Forståelse av denne prosessen er av 
stor betydning for utformingen og iverksettelsen av 
forsknings-, teknologi- og innovasjonspolitikken.  
Forskningen i STEP-gruppen er derfor sentrert 
omkring historiske, økonomiske, sosiologiske og 
organisatoriske spørsmål som er relevante for de 
brede feltene innovasjonspolitikk og økonomisk 
vekst.  
The STEP-group was established in 1991 to support 
policy-makers with research on all aspects of 
innovation and technological change, with particular 
emphasis on the relationships between innovation, 
economic growth and the social context. The basis 
of the group’s work is the recognition that science, 
technology and innovation are fundamental to 
economic growth; yet there remain many unresolved 
problems about how the processes of scientific and 
technological change actually occur, and about how 
they have social and economic impacts. Resolving 
such problems is central to the formation and 
implementation of science, technology and 
innovation policy. The research of the STEP group 
centres on historical, economic, social and 
organisational issues relevant for broad fields of 
innovation policy and economic growth. 
 
